MOGADISHU (Somaliguardian) – In June of this year, Somalia’s government announced that Ethiopian troops would be required to depart by December 31, marking the expiration of their mandate. The government further emphasized that any Ethiopian forces remaining beyond this deadline would be deemed occupiers. With the deadline now passed, many are questioning: Do Ethiopian forces now qualify as occupiers?
National Security Advisor Hussein Sheikh Ali has consistently affirmed that Ethiopia will no longer maintain a military presence in Somalia nor participate in the newly established African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), set to commence in January 2025, unless it first retracts the controversial sea access agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland.
Ethiopia has yet to annul the January agreement, which leased land along the Red Sea from Somaliland for the construction of a naval base, a move that Mogadishu views as a direct violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite the passing of the December 31 deadline, Ethiopian forces remain stationed at dozens of military bases across Somalia.
Last month, Somalia and Ethiopia reached a preliminary agreement in Turkey, though the agreement was hurriedly crafted and marred by ambiguities. The two nations agreed to resolve their year-long diplomatic dispute and continue discussions regarding Ethiopia’s access to Somali waters for commercial purposes. However, the accord did not include a provision requiring Addis Ababa to reverse its deal with Somaliland.
In the final weeks of 2024, Somali officials expressed growing uncertainty over the status of Ethiopian troops, as the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) neared its December 31 expiration. Critics argue that this crisis resulted from poor planning and a foreign policy lacking clear direction, with the government only confronting the issue when the deadline was imminent.
A Somali diplomat informed the UN Security Council last week that Ethiopian troops would not be assigned roles in AUSSOM, as all quotas had already been allocated to other troop-contributing countries. However, the National Security Advisor and the State Minister of Foreign Affairs later clarified that discussions were ongoing regarding Ethiopia’s potential participation in the peacekeeping mission, and no final decisions had been made regarding troop contributions.
For many, this situation underscores the division within the Somali government over whether Ethiopian troops should remain. The promises made earlier are viewed by critics as an attempt to distract the Somali public from the government’s failure to compel Ethiopia to retract its controversial deal with Somaliland. This, they argue, reflects the government’s broader inability to assert Somalia’s interests and defend its sovereignty, especially against Ethiopia, which is often accused of manipulating Somali leaders to serve its own interests—an agenda widely believed to have undermined Somalia’s peace and prosperity.
The recent agreement signed in Ankara, which came despite Mogadishu’s year-long stance of refusing dialogue with Addis Ababa unless the Somaliland deal was rescinded, has left many Somalis disillusioned and confronted with an uncomfortable reality. It also suggests that the promise to pressure Ethiopia into withdrawing its forces may, like others before it, result in unfulfilled expectations.
Mogadishu’s foreign policy seems increasingly complicated, as it navigates multiple agendas. The government seeks Ethiopia’s support in removing Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe, who enjoys backing from Abiy Ahmed, while simultaneously relying on deployment of Egyptian contingents to help President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud maintain power amid potential opposition. At the same time, Mogadishu is working to appease Eritrea, which continues to support the Somali National Army, all while ensuring the flow of Western donor funds that are wary of Egyptian or Eritrean forces joining AUSSOM.
In conclusion, Ethiopian troops are likely to remain in Somalia longer than anticipated. Addis Ababa has reiterated that its forces, which have crossed Somali borders for over three decades, did not come to promote peace but to safeguard Ethiopian interests. While most Somalis view Ethiopian forces as invaders, only a small group of elite politicians has legitimized their presence. Whether Mogadishu will officially recognize them as occupiers remains uncertain, though this seems unlikely, given the fear that Ethiopia has instilled in Somalia’s political elite, many of whom owe their current status to Ethiopian support.
